ABSTRACT
Their central message was that the formation of strategic alliances results from a longitudinal dynamic in which action and structure are closely intertwined. The structure of interorganizational relations is understood as a macro phenomenon emerging out of conscious micro decisions. These decisions usually have utilitarian motives (to gain access to resources). While the results of the research on policy networks presented here confirm that the development of governance systems is based on an interplay of structure and agency, it is argued that it is especially institutional factors (not only utilitarian motives) that let actors in policy networks establish multiple (horizontal) linkages.
These theoretical arguments will be illustrated by data from a study on privatization networks in East Germany during the economic transformation between 1990 and 1994 On April 1, 1991, the man who was head of Treuhandanstalt (THA), the German federal agency that was to privatize the former state assets in East Germany, was murdered in his home by left wing terrorists. The murder was a shock for the recently reunited Germany. At the time, the privatization agency was under heavy fire from both West German and East German political actors as well as from the public in East Germany. From the beginning of 1991 the economic difficulties with growing mass unemployment in East Germany had increased at a breathtaking speed and had soundly disappointed the high hopes of the East German population. At least symbolically, the murder revealed the enormous conflict potential inherent in the transformation of the East German economy by a strategy that came close to an economic shock therapy. This conflict potential held great political risks for the federal government. Not only did it threaten to undermine the power of the ruling parties, it also threatened to delegitimize the new political institutions in East Germany. The organizational and political center of this problematic transformation was symbolized through Treuhandanstalt. Especially for East Germans, the agency represented the "cold killer" of enterprises, an agent of West German industrial interests that was to close down troublesome new competitors of West German industry. Therefore the terrorists, although they were from West Germany, thought they could capitalize on East German grievances and sentiments in targeting the head of the privatization agency. West German critics, on the other hand, claimed that the privatization was too slow.
Within the overall privatization, the large industrial conglomerates, Kombinate, posed especially difficult problems for Treuhandanstalt. Decision making in these cases was very likely to become politicized
• if a high concentration of labor often in combination with a monostructured economic regional base existed (especially if the enterprises were concentrated in a single state, so that a regional political arena was likely to develop); or
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• if the enterprises were part of a crisis sector, in which new capacities in East Germany meant more overcapacities on the European market. This situation represented a redistribution conflict between West German (European) enterprises, workforce, and state officials with their East German counterparts; or
• if the enterprises were part of a sector that was traditionally the object of state subsidies or state interventions-for example, for military reasons; and
• corporative actors with sufficient resources were present.
In such cases it was very likely that a series of political, administrative, and economic actors would be mobilized and enter into bargaining processes concerning the future of these enterprises. Not surprisingly, these processes were often accompanied by regional or even national media coverage and Treuhandanstalt was usually under heavy pressure. Under such circumstances it was to be expected that the original governance structure of the transformation of the East German economy was significantly altered. In the politicized cases the discretionary leeway that the privatization agency usually exercised alone was presumably filled by a bargained solution between different actors. Because the decisions about the privatization of these companies had wider economic, social, and political consequences, they can be regarded as public policy decisions in the realm of the transformation of the East German society on a larger scale. Therefore, the bargaining systems that presumably developed around these decisions can be conceptualized as policy networks. The cases presented here, the privatization of the shipbuilding and steel industries, are two of the most prominent examples of a series of such large politicized privatizations. This article will attempt to answer the following questions: What form and shape did these policy networks have? What were the main reasons for their development? What reasons did the actors have to engage in often lengthy, tiresome negotiations that needed considerable attention and resources, thus establishing a network form of governance? What especially can be learned about the relationship of utilitarian motives vs. institutional incentives and constraints for actors to engage in network governance in publicpolicy making?
I will describe the historical and institutional background and then depict the privatization processes in the shipbuilding and steel industries. Following this I will use quantitative network analysis and a new visualization tool for social networks to portray and
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Policy Networks analyze the policy networks that evolved. I will then discuss the factors that might explain the development of these structures. Institutional factors, especially, played a vital role in the actors' decisions to establish multiple ties and engage in multilateral negotiations. This argument will be supported by data on formal institutional structures as well as informal norms and values (cognitive assessments and attitudes of the key representatives of the corporate actors).
THE PRIVATIZATION STRATEGY IN EAST GERMANY AFTER 1990: THE TREUHAND REGIME
In order to understand the privatization and its governance in the cases presented here it is crucial to recall the historical and the macroinstitutional background. The changes in the political and economic regimes in the aftermath of 1989 can undoubtedly be qualified as a rapidly and dramatically changed situation for Central and Eastern European societies. This is probably even more the case in the specific situation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), where the unification with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) resulted in the radical abolishment of existing structures and organizations and the manifest installation of new institutions and organizations. This development has generally been described as an almost complete institutional transfer (Lehmbruch 1993) . This also meant, within the context of this study, that major governance mechanisms of the West German economy, such as the regulations within the law of codetermination or interlocking directorates centered around universal banks, were transferred to East Germany.
Although far reaching institutional changes had come about with the first democratic elections in the GDR in March 1990 , the furthest reaching took place after October 3rd, 1990, when the five new LUnder became part of the FRG, taking over her institutions and laws almost completely. As a consequence, East Germany was suddenly confronted with a totally different political-administrative system, new taxation laws, new production laws, new environmental regulations, and so forth.
Before the unification in October, an economic, monetary, and social union had already been created on July 1, 1990, and this resulted in a radical change in the economic constitution. The former centrally planned economy was to be transformed into a West German-style market economy. This meant that gaining private property and making profit had at once to be accepted as the principal goal in economic activity. This general regime change had a number of important spill-offs, of which the most relevant in the
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Policy Networks Until the Maastricht treaty became effecive after the decision of the German Conititutional Court on November 1, 1993, it ,vas European Community (EC) and afterwards European Union (EU). For reasons jf simplicity, EU is used to characterize he European level or European instituions throughout the article, even if the •eference period is before that date.
The THA asked the companies to draw jp an opening balance sheet in DM as of luly 1, 1990. On that basis the companies were graded on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 meaning that the firm could be instantly jrivatized, and S that it had to be closed Jown immediately. Firms that were graded is cases that could be successfully restmcured were directly sold to an investor, sften through informal bargaining. In the -nass privatizations it was often only the Treuhand's decision whether, to whom, for what price, and under what conditions a wmpany was sold. The different criteria jie Treuhand used for its decisions were known but it was in its discretion to weigh [hem against each other in each case.
context of the present study are the introduction of a new currency and the sudden shift for East Germany from its being a part of the Comecon to being a part of the European Union (EU), 1 with its highly regulated markets.
The introduction of a new currency had the same effect as a sudden revaluation of the currency by 400 percent (Sinn and Sinn 1993) . H.W. Sinn and Westermann (2000, 18) estimate that combined with the decisive wage settlements in 1991, East Germany experienced a ten-fold increase in the relative wage in subsequent years up to the year 2000. Not even a very strong economy would have been able to absorb such a sudden shock. What followed was a total loss of competitiveness of East German firms with a rapidly decreasing demand for East German products at home and abroad and, consequently, an unprecedented deindustrialization that exceeded the Great Depression in the United States in relative terms. The East German GDP shrank by more than 40 percent from 1989 through 1991, compared to about one-third in the United States in a comparable time period (H.W. Sinn 2000, 10) .
Thus privatization in East Germany took place within a process of remodeling a whole society, unlike in any other country of the former Soviet block (COMECON) and under even more difficult conditions. The fast deindustrialization and rapid loss of employment had the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the new political system and to seriously disrupt the state unification. West Germany, on the other hand, could provide resources not available for the transformation of any other central or eastern European country: a functioning political and legal system; functioning capital and financial markets; private and public financial resources of several hundreds of billions of dollars; managers in the private and the public sector who were socialized and trained in a democratic market society.
Besides the introduction of the German Mark, the privatization of the people's property (Volkseigenes VermOgen) of the GDR was the hallmark of the transformation of the East German economy. It was foreseen to be carried out by the THA, a public agency of the federal government. It was the owner of all former state assets as well as the assets of the productive associations (Produktionsgenossenschaften) encompassing over 12.000 economic units and therefore temporarily the largest company in the world. As a consequence the THA had ultimately the control over four million employees and 40 percent of the total soil of East Germany (Sinn and Sinn 1993, 123) . Its staff grew rapidly from approximately five hundred in the summer of 1990 to over 4,500 in 1993 (Seibel 1993, 114) . In addition, the THA hired some thousand free lance consultants between (Czada 1994a . 
Policy Networks
From the available governance mechanisms to privatize and restructure whole economies or single industrial sectors, as described by Stark and Bruszt (1998) , the overall Treuhand regime clearly resembled a hierarchical-bureaucratic form of governance by spring 1991. The privatization process was coordinated primarily by administrative fiat and authority and the decision making process was highly centralized. Assets were evaluated by administrative means. The new bureaucracy assessed the economic viability of firms, selecting some for foreclosure and others for privatization, and sought out buyers for those that were designated to be privatized mainly by auction in the mass privatization or a tender process with subsequent bilateral or multilateral negotiations with potential investors in the bigger and more important cases. Although the Treuhandanstalt mainly solicited economic assessments of market performance when it conducted these evaluations, actual decisions were made on the basis of administrative measures rather than spontaneous market mechanisms.
With this rigorous approach it managed to privatize a majority of the firms within a very short time. By the end of 1993 only 1,000 firms were left. The others had been privatized, transferred to municipalities, or closed down (Czada 1994b, 2) . In order to achieve the goal of rapid restructuring, the THA was provided with far-reaching regulatory powers and controls. Therefore, some called it a most powerful second national government 3 or a super ministry for the economic development of East Germany. 4 In the beginning, the newly founded Lander in East Germany were administratively and strategically very weak and no match for this powerful agency. In its central offices in Berlin the THA had located the control and fiscal overhead functions as well as the strategic planning and the operative functions for the more important firms. Interestingly, this governance structure stood in sharp contrast to the existing differentiated and decentralized federal political-administrative structure of Germany. According to Stark (1992, 29) , "Charged with the task of performing triage on the wounded enterprises of the formerly East German economy, the Treuhandanstalt or Trust has single-handedly carried out functions that are performed elsewhere in the region by diverse governmental units scattered across the ministries of Industry, Planning, Finance, Labour, and Privatization."
The devastating consequences of the shock therapy became apparent and entered the public discussion in early 1991, after the end of the Gulf War. The Treuhandanstalt had to face a sometimes hostile climate and increasingly strong political pressure from trade unions, East German state governments, East German members of parliaments, and the general public in East Germany. On the other hand, it had to face sometimes harsh criticism from West German
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Policy Networks industry, which claimed that the privatization was not proceeding fast enough and that the requests of investors were not handled satisfactorily. The main conflict, however, centered around whether the Treuhandanstalt should sell companies by any means whatsoever and close uncompetitive ones or whether it should pursue an active role in the recapitalization and restructuring of the companies. In this situation, the privatization and restructuring of large politicized companies gained an enormous political importance. Crucial questions arose: Would, and could, the Treuhandanstalt and the German federal government continue with their strategy of a rapid privatization through a highly centralized bureaucracy as the main vehicle for the fast transformation? Could they uphold this strategy and this governance form even in cases in which the negative economic and social consequences of this strategy were highly concentrated and visible and in which incalculable political conflicts could therefore have developed that had the potential to even endanger the overall political transformation? Or did the governance form and the combined strategy change in these cases; if so, in what direction?
'Besides Poland, the ODR was the best location to build ships within the Comecon, since her coast was free of ice almost the whole year.
LARGE POLITICIZED PRIVATIZATIONS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE SHIPBUILDING AND STEEL INDUSTRIES
The GDR shipbuilding industry was organized in a single industrial conglomerate Kombinat, which was legally transformed into a joint-stock company in June 1990 and was then called Deutsche Maschinen-und Schiffbau AG (DMS). The company consisted of five shipyards, with one engine company at its core; together with other machine tool and engineering parts it had a total of 60,000 employees in 1990. These firms were all located at the coastal area of the Baltic Sea. The GDR had-if compared with other industrialized countries on the basis of the number of inhabitants-an extremely large shipbuilding industry. This was because, due to the division of labor between the countries of the Comecon, the GDR had to build large parts of the fishing and trade fleets especially for the Soviet Union. 5 Consequently, in 1988 the GDR became the world's leading producer offish trawlers. The region in which these shipyards were located, which after unification became the State Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, was heavily dependent on the shipbuilding industry.
As a consequence of unification, the industry found itself in a radically changed situation: first, it was cut off from its traditional markets in Central and Eastern Europe; second, the industry was at the same time not able to compete with Western producers in terms of quality; third, adding the enormous East German capacities to the West German capacities led to a situation in which the industry was 587/J-PART, October 2002 Policy Networks potentially in conflict with the capacity and subsidizing regulations that existed for this sector on the European level (Art. 92 EEC Treaty and the 7th directive on shipbuilding); fourth, these regulations contended that in 1991 member states of the EU were allowed to pay subsidies only up to 15 percent of the price of a ship. Subsidies for other reasons were allowed only for restructuring, so as to cut down overall capacities. Both types of subsidies had to be reported to and allowed by the EU Commission; fifth, since the West German, as well as the other EU member states' shipbuilding industries, had recently (e.g., the second half of the 1980s) gone through a painful restructuring process, they were fiercely opposed to being again confronted with new capacities.
The privatization process in the shipbuilding industry started shortly before the monetary union (July 1, 1990) with the transformation of DMS (Deutsche-Maschinen und Schiffbau AG) into a joint-stock company. As early as in this initial phase, West German producers' association and West German experts were involved.
The following actors entered the privatization scene, one after another, and were all in place early in 1991: the five leading West German shipbuilding producers, in two cases backed by leading West German industrial groups; 6 representatives of the four West German states with shipbuilding production sites; the regional section of the metal workers union (e.g., the famous IG Metall) and the workers' councils; the board of directors and the supervisory board of the DMS AG; the board of directors and the supervisory board of the Treuhandanstalt; the economics ministry and the state chancellery of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; the parties within the state parliament of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; the mayors of the cities with production sites within their jurisdictions; the ministries of finance and economics and the chancellery of the federal government in Bonn; the producers association; and last but not least, the Commission of the European Union (see exhibit 1).
All these corporative actors presented different interests about the mode and direction of the privatization or were directly affected by the privatization process. Some of them were well connected through interlocking directorates. Almost all persons involvedincluding those (very often West Germans) with positions in East Germany-knew each other from previous decision processes in the shipbuilding scene in northern Germany.
'The West German shipbuilding sector With time passing, and given the very difficult situation, the was highly concentrated. In 1989 the four )eve | o f public conflict regarding the privatization process increased Policy Networks the Treuhandanstalt. They argued that a very fast privatization would damage the restructuring process and would cost a lot of jobs because the Treuhandanstalt would have to accept almost any offer from potential investors. They claimed that before the marriage the bride had to be adorned. 7 This position received fierce opposition from the three actors of the federal government (the ministries of finance, economics, and the chancellery) and the Treuhandanstalt as well as the West German producers and their association. They were afraid that such a solution would be exemplary for other companies, that it would mean a departure from the strategy of fast privatization in general, and that an additional state-aided competitor would be created.
A second group favored a privatization of major parts to the largest West German producer in order to achieve synergy. This solution was opposed by the state ministry of economics, the actors of the federal government, and the other West German producers, but it was favored by the director of the Treuhandanstalt, the union, the state chancellery, and a majority of the political parties in the state.
A third alternative was the privatization of the parts to different investors. This solution was favored by the economics ministry of the state, the actors of the federal government, and the EU Commission.
In late 1991, the public conflict became so turbulent that demonstrations, strikes, and occupations of the firms were nearly a daily occurrence. In March 1992 , the Treuhandanstalt finally decided to privatize the most profitable parts to the largest West German producer and a Norwegian investor in order to split the risk and to postpone the privatization of the other parts of the Kombinat, for which no investor could be found at the time. In June 1992, the EU Commission finally approved the Treuhand's privatization plans and made a decision about the necessary capacity reduction and level of subsidies allowed. In the time between these two decisions a bargaining process took place between the German actors, the investors, their competitors, the Commission, and governments of other member states. A compromise had to be found between the German wish to save an industrial core at the coast as a seed for further economic development and the hope of the other EU member states that such a solution would not produce any disadvantages for other European producers and countries. The privatization and restructuring process cost about six billion Deutschmarks (DM) until 1994, keeping around ten thousand direct jobs for the moment. time. It also restricted the overall production capacities for a considerable time to come. In return, it allowed the German government to generously subsidize the restructuring as a unique exception due to the legacies of the transformation, but otherwise it kept the regime of competition control in place. The Treuhandanstalt and the federal government achieved the privatiza-tion in these difficult cases and limited the otherwise enormous payments. They also achieved a splitting of the investors and there-fore a risk diversion. The union would have liked a solution that included the one big West German investor that was seen as being the most receptive to union demands. It was hoped that this solution would create synergism and therefore would create the best conditions to secure jobs. The union did not bring about that solution, but neither was there a further distribution to more than the two main investors. The board of directors of the East German company that would have liked to first restructure the company itself and then sell it was the one actor whose interests were necessarily not included in the compromise. Consequently, the board resigned after the decision was made. Although such major goals as the preservation of all sites as industrial cores and privatization within four years were achieved, the outcome assessment by the involved actors was mixed or negative.* Actors believed either that the compromise had diminished the chances of actual achievement of the synergy necessary for competition with shipyards in East Asia, or that the risk diversion did not go far enough and, therefore, that the prospects and concepts of the largest West German investor were not good enough.
The outcome, which followed to a large extent the interests of the federal government and the Treuhandanstalt, indicates a strong position for these actors.
The GDR steel industry comprised three Kombinate, each consisting of several steel producing firms, together employing eighty thousand people in 1990. The main production sites were located in four of the five new East German states, in contrast to only one in the shipbuilding case. Therefore, the pressure on any one state government was not quite as high as in the shipbuilding case. Compared to the West European producers, their productivity was about 30 percent and the GDR steel industry was, in terms of production technology, about fifteen years behind (Wienert 1992) .
The GDR steel industry was confronted with changes in its environment similar to those in the shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, in this case the West European producers had recently suffered from overcapacities, which led to EU action to confront the situation. Consequently, no need was apparent for additional 'According to regulations in the treaty for the European Community for Coal and Steel, not only state subsidies but also regular larger investments have to be reported to the EU Commission.
Policy Networks production capacities from East Germany in the European Common Market. Moreover, it was believed that the additional East German demand could easily be satisfied with the existing EU capacities. What made the situation even worse was that EU regulations that prohibited state subsidies to companies were even more restrictive and far reaching than were the regulations for the shipbuilding industry.
9 In addition, the EU Commission traditionally had played a stronger role in the steel than in the shipbuilding industry. Consequently, how privatization ever came about in such a radically changed and restrictive situation is a puzzle that requires study. In the case of the steel industry the analysis will be limited to the privatization and restructuring process of one major production unit, the Eko-StahlAG.
In 1990, the Eko steel company employed twelve thousand people. It is located directly at the Polish border in what was to become the state of Brandenburg. The company had one noteworthy handicap at the time. During its almost forty years of existence, the GDR economic authorities never managed to close a technological gap in the steel production chain (hot flat rolling mill). As a consequence, raw steel, to be rolled, had to be sent to companies in West Germany or the Soviet Union, over hundreds of miles, and then brought back for further processing. Moreover, what had once been an advantageous location (e.g., close to the Comecon customers and to the raw materials from Poland and the Soviet Union) turned out after unification to be at the extreme periphery of the European market.
The privatization process was difficult and prolonged. In 1992, the Treuhand almost found an investor, the West German steel producer Krupp. However, they decided against the deal shortly before it was to be made. The same happened in 1994 with the Italian investor, Riva. The decision by the Treuhand to sell Eko to Riva was heavily contested by many, especially by the union, the Eko leadership, and the West German steel industry. Consequently Riva backed out, since it seemed that they had better investment opportunities in Italy at the time. Finally, at the end of 1994, the Treuhandanstalt managed to sell Eko to a Belgian steel company, Cockerill-Sambre. Apart from the related social and economic problems (despite the successful privatization ten thousand people were laid off in four years) a major political problem had to be solved: the federal government, the Treuhandanstalt, and the state of Brandenburg were willing to pay a total of 1.2 billion DM for the restructuring as a "gift to come with the bride." This resulted in a protest by the large steel producers in West Germany, in other EU countries, and, last but not least, the EU Commission. An extensive bargaining process brought about the following solution: Cockerill
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Policy Networks purchased 60 percent of Eko AG from the Treuhand for a symbolic price of 1 Deutschmark with an option for the other 40 percent within five years. It was agreed that 1.1 billion DM should be invested to modernize the plant and close the gap in production. Four hundred forty million would be paid by Cockerill, 660 million by the state and federal governments. Eko purchased a rolling mill from another East German producer, which was to be closed down to compensate for the additional capacities in East Germany. The production of steel at the Eko plant was restricted to 900,000 tons a year till the year 2000 and then 1.5 million tons afterwards. Moreover, 2,300 jobs were guaranteed by Cockerill in their contract with the Treuhand. This was achieved despite the resistance of the large West German steel producers and their association and some member states in the EU. Also, the EU Commission succeeded in keeping the subsidies to a limited time period and in imposing a quite rigid production capacity limit until the year 2000; this would ease afterwards. The German government on the other hand could pay an enormous but still limited amount of money for the restructuring. In the end, an investor was found that both the union and the East German company leadership liked. The investor promised to keep a realistic number of jobs and to complete the restructuring in order to create a fully operational steel plant (a development that the West German steel community did not necessarily like and that they tried to avoid by their alternative suggestions). The federal and the state governments achieved their goal to preserve an industrial core but to still privatize the company and therefore limit the payments to the scheduled restructuring. The union achieved its goal of preserving the site with steel production and saving a realistic number of jobs. The outcome assessment of the actors, contrary to those in the shipbuilding industry, was very positive. It was overwhelmingly thought that the company had found a strong private partner with a concept that would lead to competitiveness in the near future. Even the West German steel industry, which had fought the subsidizing of the competitor at the Polish border, acknowledged the technical achievements and the enormous progress that had been made. In fact, the privatization of the EKO steel plant is seen as one of the success stories of the economic transformation in East Germany.
The following actors are important in the negotiation process: the four leading producers in the West German steel industry-in three cases backed by leading West German industrial groups; the West German state of Nordhrein-Westfalen, which had the largest share of steel production sites and was Brandenburg's West German partner state; the regional part of the metal workers union and the workers' council; the board of directors and the supervisory board of the Eko Stahl AG; the board of directors and the supervisory
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Policy Networks board of the privatization agency; the state government and factions of the parliament of Brandenburg; the mayor of the production site and his administration; the ministries of finance and economics and the chancellery of the federal government in Bonn; the producers' association; and, last but not least, the EU Commission (see exhibit 2).
The narrative account of the privatization processes reveals that a complex bargaining process had evolved and considerable changes in the governance structure had taken place in these cases, especially when they are compared with the overall governance structure of the privatization in East Germany. A multitude of actors entered the arena and sought to influence the decision process about the future of those companies. But did this really lead to a network in the sense of a policy-making arrangement characterized by a predominance of informal communicative relations, a horizontal as opposed to a hierarchical pattern of relations, and a decentralized pattern of actors' positions (see Kenis and Schneider 1991) as we may conclude after the narrative account? Did the Treuhandanstalt lose its dominant position? What kind of governance structure developed instead? How much influence did the federal government exert on the decision within that structure? Did the interests of the West German competitors and investors dominate the process, as it was often assumed in East Germany? These questions will be answered by the application of quantitative network methods.
DATA
The data that will be presented were collected in 1997 and 1998, and they concern the relations in the period from 1990 to 1994. In a preliminary study in 1995 and 1996 , the network boundaries of the bargaining systems in the shipbuilding and steel industries were specified by analyzing newspaper reports and interviewing experts (see the lists of actors in exhibits 1 and 2). A combination of the "nominalist and realist approach" (Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983; Knoke 1990 ) was applied to determine the network boundaries. Both the newspaper reports about the privatization of the shipbuilding and steel industries and the experts who were interviewed revealed a stable group of corporate actors and their main representatives who were either active in or at least interested in the outcome of the processes (realist approach). On the other hand, those who applied formal criteria (nominalist approach) included a group of West German economic actors specific to each branch. Using these first results about the actor systems, a standardized questionnaire was developed by which relational as well as categorical data were collected on the different actors. Policy Networks while representatives of the organizations were interviewed or they were filled out and sent back by these representatives through regular mail. Steel industry relational data were obtained from all twenty-one actors, and shipbuilding industry relational data were obtained from twenty-three out of twenty-seven actors. The data were processed and network indices were calculated with UCINET IV and UCINET V (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 1991) . The algorithm of Burt's STRUCTURE was used in the implementation of SONIS to calculate the rank prestige measure (Pappi and Stelck 1988) .
Before network measures were calculated a decision had to be made regarding how to transform the raw data. Very often, persons have quite different perceptions about their relations or give contradictory information about relations. This is even more so if organizations or parts of organizations are the nodes of the structure (Marsden 1990) . Missing data is also a problem, since the researcher can gain information on a relation from one party only. Sometimes these graphs can be treated as directed graphs, although the type of tie is undirected; in a second step, the unconfirmed ties can be the subject of further analysis, indicating a hierarchical relationship (Blau 1963, 145-50) . Often it does not make theoretical sense (there is either confidential communication between two parties or there is not), and some network measures can be calculated only for undirected graphs. Therefore, a decision must be made to code these relations as either an existing or as a nonexisting tie. Some researchers plead for a defensive strategy (Pappi, KOnig, and Knoke 1995; Provan and Milward 1995) , thus taking only confirmed ties as relevant for the analysis. The disadvantage of this procedure is that much information is lost because ties that are not confirmed are not included in the analysis. In this analysis, however, the maximizing procedure was applied (unconfirmed ties were counted as an existing relation) for the following reasons:
• The amount of missing data is small. Missing data are often coded as a nonexisting tie in network analysis, and if a large amount is missing results can be inaccurate.
• Nonconfirmed ties indicate a relation, if one assumes that respondents do not completely invent relations to make themselves seem more important If both parties respond to their best knowledge, there is often a different evaluation of the importance of a relation. Very often, people remember only those relations that are important to them, although others might also exist. During the gathering of the relational data, we noted a general tendency: actors with a higher formal position named lower actors less frequently than the other way around, although they talked about communicating with them
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• The most important reason to include nonconfirmed ties in the analysis is the specific circumstances of the studied cases. Both privatization processes were highly politicized and conflict ridden. In the case of the shipbuilding industry, the main investor went bankrupt four years after the privatization in 1996, which caused a loss of 850 million DM 10 in public subsidies. Under these circumstances it was much less likely that respondents would actually overstate rather than that they would remain silent about their relations in order to downplay their involvement.
The results of the network analysis are reported in exhibits 1 and 2 and the visualizations are displayed in exhibits 3-10. Data were further collected on attitudes, ideas, and perceptions of the actors; these are reported in exhibit 11, and on outcome assessments, which are briefly reported in the narrative account. Respondents were asked to rate a statement about attitudes, ideas, and perceptions on a Likert scale from 1 (is very much in accordance with the standpoint of the organization) to 5 (is not at all in accordance with the standpoint of the organization). The number of respondents who answered the questions in exhibit 11 is for both sectors around twenty. This is, of course, far too low a number to conduct a rigorous statistical analysis. However, the respondents represent a large majority of the actors involved and give an indication of what the dominant perceptions and ideas were in governing these processes.
FORM AND SHAPE OF THE POLICY NETWORKS
The analysis shows that both privatizations have been complex, conflict-ridden bargaining processes among a multitude of corporate actors; twenty-seven in the shipbuilding industry and twenty-one in the steel industry were identified who sought to directly or indirectly influence the privatization and restructuring. In both cases, the types of actors are quite similar; sometimes they are nearly identical.
The number and variety of actors, as shown in the exhibits, demonstrate that the original hierarchical-bureaucratic governance structure of mass privatizations, in which the Treuhandanstalt was "The exchange rate between DM and more or ' ess tne on ' v actor ^ c ' ear 'y dominated the decisions, had USS was very roughly 2:1.
been significantly differentiated.
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Policy Networks ''Applying Burt's rank prestige concept (1991) for the calculation of the prestige scores, an actor (i) is attributed more prestige the more nominations other actors (k) give him (in degree) and the higher their rank prestige is. The concept also includes how many other actors (j) are named by (k). If (i) is the only actor named by (k); if there is no (j), he is attributed more prestige than if he had to share (k's) rank prestige with others. The index suggested by Krackhardt (1994) was used to determine the degree of hierarchization. It is defined as the ratio between the number of pairs of directly or indirectly connected actors in a directed graph (D) and the number of pairs that are characterized by mutual reachability, represented in a reachability digraph (D). Thus the level of hierarchization is 1 (number of pairs with mutual reachability/number of connected pairs). If all connected pairs can reach each other in both directions, the level of hierarchization equals zero. If all connected pairs in a social system can reach each other in one but not in the other direction, the hierarchization equals 1. The index was calculated with "Krackplot" (Krackhardt, Blyth, and McGrath 1994) .
"The graphs presented here were generated with Visone, a new visualization program for social network visualization that has recently been developed at the University of Konstanz, Germany. The theoretical considerations and methods are reported in Brandes et a). (1999a; 1999b; 2001) .
The description and analysis of the policy networks were based on a variety of links like confidential communication, formal obligation of report, strategic collaboration, political support, and consideration of other actors' interests in one's own decision making. Three of these types of tie will be reported here: confidential communication and consideration of other actors' interests in one's own decision making for the description of the policy networks, and the structure based on formal obligation of report as an explanatory factor.
It can be assumed that confidential communication is rich in all sorts of information. Very often statements off the record are the important ones for actors because they transfer information and knowledge that cannot be gained otherwise. Respondents were asked to indicate with which of the other actors they mutually exchanged confidential information concerning the privatization of companies in the East German shipbuilding and steel industries. A central position in such a structure creates the possibility of controlling information and therefore of gaining influence, if centrality (closeness or betweenness) in communication networks is regarded as an indicator for influence (Knoke 1990, 13; Freeman 1979, 221) ."
The structure on the basis of the tie consideration of other actors' interests can be regarded as the final power structure in political decision making. Respondents were asked to name up to six other actors whose interests, goals, decisions, or expectations they had taken into account in their own decision making. Usually, actors take the interests of others into account either if they have to be afraid of sanctions or if they behave in a certain way on the basis of specific information.
12
Exhibits 3 through 6 display the structure of confidential communication during the privatization of the shipbuilding and steel industries (for the listing of the centrality and rank prestige scores, see exhibit 1 [shipbuilding] and exhibit 2 [steel]). 13 The nodes (different shades and shapes represent different types of actors) are placed according to their centrality scores (exhibits 3 and 5: betweenness; exhibits 4 and 6: closeness). Black nodes represent political-administrative actors (rhombs-federal level; ovals-EU Commission; circles-state actors; squares-local actors), light gray nodes represent party caucuses and dark gray squares represent industrial branch actors (firms and industrial associations). The gray rectangle symbolizes the metal workers' union and the dark ovals symbolize the actors within the East German firm.
The light gray concentric circles in the background represent different levels of centrality. Nodes on the same circle have the
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Exhibit 3 Betweenness Centrality on the Basis of Confidential Communication in the Shipbuilding Industry
same centrality. The farther-out nodes are placed, the less central they are according to the centrality index. The outermost dashed line signals the centrality level of the most peripheral actor of the actor system in regard to the type of tie and type of centrality displayed.
The visualization reveals that the communication between the actors was quite intensive. The structure shows a density of 48 percent (e.g., 48 percent of ah 1 potential communication relations were realized). Although it is difficult to compare different policy networks in terms of density that vary considerably in the number of actors, it is safe to say that the communication was extraordinarily frequent and intense in this case, as in the case of the steel industry (exhibits 5 and 6).
hi the shipbuilding case, the metal workers' union (11) clearly was the most central actor within the communication structure in terms of betweenness and closeness centrality. The visualization of the betweenness centrality (exhibit 3) is somewhat misleading, however, because the range of the values is rather small, while the
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Exhibit 4 Closeness Centrality on the Basis of Confidential Communication in the Shipbuilding Industry
metal workers' union (11) receives a normalized score of approximately 18 percent and the actors on the dashed line in the periphery 0 percent). Because of the dense communication, the differences in centrality between the actors are not that big, as shown in exhibits 1 and 4: the union (11) as the most central actor has a centrality score of approximately 93 percent, and the most peripheral actor, the liberal party caucus in the federal parliament, still has 49 percent. It can be observed, however, that the industrial sector actors, mostly West German companies, and the industrial association (dark gray squares; 2, 17, 19, 22, 25) are more in the periphery, hi addition, it is not the Treuhandanstalt (23 and 24) but the union (11) that is the most influential actor. This is because in Germany union functionaries are regularly members of the supervisory board of big corporations, and by law the employee bench has hah 1 " of the seats in this body. Furthermore, they usually have regular access to the highest government ranks at the state as well as the federal level. Therefore, the union could function as a broker. As is to be expected with dense structures and with an even distribution of centrality scores, the centralization for betweenness centrality can be regarded as rather low (16.62 percent). Influence therefore can be regarded as
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Exhibit 5 Betweenness Centrality on the Basis of Confidential Communication in the Steel Industry
quite evenly distributed. Both visualizations in exhibits 3 and 4 show the centrality of the union (11) in the communication structure.
The communication structure within the privatization process of EKO Stahl (steel industry) has a slightly different form than the one for the shipbuilding industry, as can be seen in exhibits 5 and 6 (for the listing of the centrality and rank prestige scores for the steel case see exhibit 2), although they resemble each other in important characteristics.
As was true in the shipbuilding case, a quite dense communication structure (60 percent) with a rather low centralization value for the betweenness centrality (5.4 percent) existed. The actors within the Treuhandanstalt (19/20) do not occupy the most central positions in the communication structure with regard to either betweenness or closeness centrality. However, the board of directors of the Treuhandanstalt (20) can be regarded as an important actor in the communication structure. Exhibits 5 and 6 reveal that this actor is in fact the third most central. Furthermore, the
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Exhibit 6 Closeness Centrality on the Basis of Confidential Communication in the Steel Industry
communication structure has one decisive difference. It is centered around the state government, Brandenburg (4)-site of the plantas well as the supervisory board of the East German company (11), and not around the union (14). The former two could play the role as mediators between different interests. The state government, with a very popular minister president, had ties to all other actors, and therefore had a closeness centrality score of 100 percent. Despite a high density, the centralization of the confidential communication for closeness centrality is rather high (50.98 percent).
Exhibit 7 displays the structure based on the type of tie formal obligation of report and exhibit 8 the final power structure on the basis of consideration of interest during the privatization of the shipbuilding industry. Shapes and shades of the nodes follow the logic described for the centrality layout. The light gray horizontal lines indicate the prestige levels. The higher a node is placed in the layout, the higher its prestige.
Shading and dashing of the edges indicate whether an asymmetric link originates with an actor that has a higher prestige score (dashed black lines, top to bottom) or with an actor that has a lower one (light gray, bottom up). A symmetric tie is characterized by a solid black line. Given the type of tie, consideration of interest,
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Exhibit 7 Rank Prestige on the Basis of Formal Obligation of Report in the Shipbuilding Industry
black lines indicate a mutual consideration of interests between two actors. Exhibit 7 shows the formal report structure. It is clear that it was quite hierarchical (only edges pointing bottom up) and the political-administrative actors dominate the structure (black and light gray nodes). This was very similar to the structure in the case of the steel industry, which is displayed in exhibit 9.
Regarding the final power positions based on the tie consideration of other actors'interests (see exhibits 8 and 10), the board of directors of the Treuhandanstalt was in both cases the most prominent actor (no. 24 in the shipbuilding case and no. 20 in the steel case/normalized score of 1.0), although it did not play the central role in the communication structures. It is followed by the federal ministry of economics (5/. 84) in the shipbuilding and the state government of Brandenburg (4/.94) in the steel case. The overall dominant feature of the power structures is administrative and government bodies (black nodes), which all are on top. The branch actors (companies and the producers' associations represented by dark gray squares) are not very central in the communication structures, and it is somewhat surprising that they are not very prominent
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Exhibit 8 Rank Prestige on the Basis of Consideration of Interest hi the Shipbuilding Industry (Power)
in the final power structures either. The EU Commission (9 in both cases) is an important player, although it is less important than are the top national political and administrative actors.
This gives a hint that the administrative actors could both very much profit from and preserve the power that comes from formal decision rights and competencies. When we look at the visualizations for obligation of report, indicating formal decision rights for the actors with higher prestige, we note that the party caucuses in the parliaments (light gray circles) and the political-administrative actors of the federal, state, and European level (black rhombs and circles) clearly dominate the structure. The branch actors (dark gray squares) find themselves at the bottom of the power hierarchy in both cases.
The hierarchization for the power structure is 53 percent in the shipbuilding and 63 percent in the steel case, because of the power differences between political-administrative and private actors. The visual analysis reveals that administrative actors formed a powerful decision core, mostly directly or indirectly, mutually considering
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Exhibit 9 Rank Prestige on the Basis of Formal Obligation of Report in the Steel Industry their interests (black lines)
. This is further demonstrated by the hierarchization between these actors only, which is 0 percent in both cases. The overall hierarchization is therefore created by private and societal actors considering the interests of the politicaladministrative actors. This clearly shows that neither the organized business interests nor the large West German companies exercised great power.
Summing up: The quantitative network analysis shows that the dense communication structures between a multitude of actors that developed in both cases very much resemble networks. The actors of the privatization agency do not occupy the most central positions in the communication structures. The union in the shipbuilding case and the state government in the steel case are the most prominent, hi the final power structure, however, which is characterized by a medium hierarchization, a dominant core of political-administrative actors is visible with the two actors within the Treuhandanstalt still very much on top. Therefore-given the dense, rather horizontal communication structures based on confidential communication and the moderately hierarchical power structure-it can be
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Exhibit 10 Rank Prestige on the Basis of Consideration of Interest in the Steel Industry
concluded that a network form of governance developed with some hierarchical elements. There is some evidence from the formal report structure that formal institutional norms might have caused these hierarchical elements, which I will explore in more detail in the section on the explanatory factors.
The combination of dense horizontal communication structures and medium hierarchical power structures had specific effects on the development and outcome of both privatization processes. Although many actors were coopted formally and informally, the Treuhandanstalt could ultimately hold its prominent position with the backing of the federal and state government. The dominance of the Treuhandanstalt together with the federal government and the East German state governments secured, with the backing of enormous financial resources, the strategy of fast privatization ("Privatisierung ist die beste Sanierung"). In both cases privatization came about within four years, and the closure as well as permanent state holdings were avoided, although only 20 to 30 percent of the original jobs were kept.
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If these features were key to the fairly successful outcomes given the very difficult circumstances, this question evolves: What are the factors that can explain, how these specific structures came about?
EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY NETWORKS l4
The Treuhandanstalt needed competent managers at the top of the plants until a privatization solution could be achieved. In both cases, experienced managers from West Germany were hired to keep the firms running and prepare them for restructuring. As a consequence, these managers, because of their experience, knowledge, and personal standing, participated in the decision process about privatization and restructuring. Usually the Treuhandanstalt made its decisions without consulting those who were former managers of the firms.
The following explanatory factors are not independent, but rather interdependent Nonetheless, for heuristic purposes it is necessary to try to distinguish them to learn more about the preconditions for the development of policy networks.
Technical Necessities and Deficiencies of the Standard (Treuhand) Mode of Privatization
The deficiency of the Treuhand as a privatization agency, at least for the two cases studied, lay in a principal discrepancy between its structure and the type of task it had to fulfill. This discrepancy became obvious in at least three ways: First, a discrepancy existed between the resources needed and the resources available for orchestrating the privatization processes; second, a discrepancy existed between the hierarchical command structure of the Treuhand and the nonroutine types of decisions to be made; and third, a discrepancy existed between the Treuhand's ownership of the entire national economy of the GDR and the Treuhand's ownership of the problem.
The discrepancy between the resources needed and the resources available led to the Treuhand's structural resource dependency upon other actors. It becomes clear in these two cases that a complex set of actors got involved, and this set of actors submitted knowledge, formal competencies, resources, and consent in the course of the privatization process. These types of resources turned out to be crucial for arriving at a privatization solution, but they were usually dispersed among a large number of actors. The Treuhandanstalt needed from other actors a lot of expertise that could only be gained through its willingness to let them participate in the decision process. This was very important, because in the two cases privatization and restructuring were highly intertwined.
14 The information had to be already processed to gain efficiency and to avoid information overload.
A discrepancy existed between the hierarchical command structure of the Treuhand and nonroutine types of decisions that needed to be made. Conventional wisdom in organization theory states that routine and nonroutine tasks require different
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The discrepancy between the ownership of the objects to privatize and the ownership of the privatization problem led to a situation in which economic units could not just be privatized according to the bookkeeping standards of the Treuhand. Other standards, which were not necessarily those of the Treuhand, were carried into the privatization process. In other words, the privatization process was politicized, and the Treuhand again became dependent on its environment-this time with respect to the definition of the problem. A number of actors claimed at least partial ownership of the problem: first, political actors, especially the federal government and the state government, had an overwhelming interest in a positive solution to the problem, since both of these privatization processes were highly symbolic in the preservation of jobs and of industrial structures on which to build further economic development. Indeed, Chancellor Kohl had given a guarantee regarding the preservation of both industrial locations as industrial cores. Therefore, the Treuhand was pressed to work toward a positive solution. Furthermore, the different interests of affected actors could not be reconciled by administrative fiat within the original Treuhand mode of privatization, since it was a participating actor and not the neutral hierarchical unit placed over all the others. 15 Finally, privatization in sectors, which are highly regulated on the European level, meant that inevitably the EU Commission would become an important actor by formal competence and another focus for other actors to exert influence. 16 That the standard Treuhand model was deficient in many respects when it came to the privatization of the two sectors does not explain, however, why an alternative solution to the problem developed, and it explains even less why policy networks developed that still had a significant hierarchical component, hi the next part of this essay I will show that the governance structure that unfolded had a number of advantages in the cases that are studied here.
Advantages of the Intel-organizational Network Mode of Privatization
"This role was sometimes played by the federal chancellery, though. "In general, no solution was possible without the consent of the EU Council of Ministers. Usually the EU Commission prepares the decisions so that they are very likely to be passed in the council. Therefore, the frame of possible options is given by the Commission in advance.
The privatization process of both sectors was characterized by a number of task contingencies. These were unexpected events, uncertainties about attitudes and strategies of other actors, and the crucial question of how to balance and reconcile the different goals in the privatization decision (e.g., balancing price, Treuhand and investors' investments, entrepreneurial conception, employment and participation in environmental clean-up projects, roles in regional industrial policy, and market regulation on the European level).
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Policy Networks ""Networks are particularly apt for circumstances in which there is a need for efficient, reliable information. The most useful information is rarely that which flows down the formal chain of command in an organization ... [rjather, it is that which is obtained from someone whom you have dealt with in the past and found reliable" (Powell 1990 Interorganizational networks seem to have competitive advantages in dealing with such task contingencies, because informal communication is not a supplement to but the decisive and defining element of interorganizational relations (Chishobn 1989) , which makes them "lighter on their feet than hierarchies" (Powell 1990, 303) . They enable the actors to communicate in a pragmatic way with each other and exchange trustworthy, reliable information and tacit knowledge. An important characteristic of informal communication is that it allows for deviation from formal ways to communicate, thus shortening the time needed to make decisions. 17 This type of communication becomes more important as the actors face more uncertainties," and as the process becomes more dynamic and more conflict ridden. As we have seen, the decisive problem for the Treuhandanstalt was how to balance the different decision criteria. In this respect, informal communication in interorganizational relationships played a vital role, because actors could discuss the problems in terms of what they thought was reasonable without having to fear the reactions by the press or the public.
The line of reasoning that I have presented for the explanation of the development of the governance structure was mainly based on arguments from contingency theory, hence functionalist arguments. They claim that networks, like governance forms, were a functional response to the tasks that privatization and transformation in these sectors demanded. It is, however, not a sufficient explanation for their development. The response is not automatic. It depends at the same time on a series of contextual and institutional factors (see Hollingsworth 1996; Kenis 1991; Mayntz 1996) .
Contextual Factors
In the cases that are presented here, important contextual factors were (1) a relatively high organizational density of a differentiated set of public and private actors who could potentially participate in the process; (2) the presence of some more or less central lead actors around which these actors could organize (e.g., the Treuhand and the federal chancellery).
In general, the organizational density in the economic sphere is very high in Germany. Business, labor, and public administration are represented by a large number of organizations, which are active in different fields and on different administrative levels. Consequently, it is very likely within such a system that these organizations will be mobilized in times of rapidly changing circumstances or even in a crisis (see Kenis 1992) ." On the other hand, a great number of dispersed actors will have difficulty forming a policy network, although it is difficult to determine the critical number for each instance (see Kenis 1991, 313) .
'"Several institutions were set up; among them were Treuhandwirtschaftskabinette (common meetings of the state cabinet with the Treuhand directorates), monthly meetings about special sectors between Treuhand and state officials, and an early warning system for the state governments when firms were to be closed down.
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Another factor that facilitated the development of an interorganizational solution is the presence of central actors around which these actors could organize (e.g., the Treuhand and the Bundeskanzleramt [federal chancellery]). As Provan and Milward (1995) demonstrate, an important factor in explaining the internal coherence and the effectiveness of networks is the presence of a central organization in the network, which mainly functions as a promoter of the issue. The Treuhand and the federal chancellery played this role. After an early period in the overall privatization process, which was characterized by centralization around the privatization agency, a period of redifferentiation of the system was observed in the spring of 1991. A number of institutions were set up in order to cope with the increasing economic crisis, the increasing political conflicts, and the insufficient coordination devices. 20 Consequently, the Treuhand's situation changed from being the main responsible actor in the privatization process to being just a part (although the most important part) of a privatization network (see Czada 1994a). This does not mean, however, that the focal organization always is the most central and most powerful in the system. It is more a function of orientation and of coordination and not necessarily one of power. It perhaps is better for a decision process when the coordinating actor is not the most powerful one and can therefore better function as a moderator.
The importance of (institutional) preconditions for the development of policy networks will be further exemplified by looking at the formal and informal institutions that formed the basis on which the governance structures herein described developed.
Formal and Informal Institutions
The narrative account and the structural analysis show that quite similar governance structures developed in both cases, although there were still important differences. Therefore, the assumption can be made that institutional factors on the (macro) level of the political system had a decisive influence on the formation of the governance structures. Moreover, the sector-specific features (meso level) in these two cases resemble each other quite closely-for example, the level of EU regulation, general politicization, market concentration, size of the companies, and the strategic repertoire or how to resolve industrial crises (see Kenis 1991) .
A good indication of the importance of formal institutional rules and decision competencies is the structure based on the type of tie, formal obligation of report (see exhibits 7 and 9). It reveals relationships of superVsubordination. An asymmetric tie indicates, for example, if one actor has formally to report to the other but not "Individual scores and the level of hierarchizaticm were calculated for consideration of interest.
''The layout principles and the algorithm for determining prestige follow those described for the final power structure based on the tie consideration of interest.
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vice versa, that the latter is in a superior position. Formal obligation of report is also a good proxy to identify positions of formal decision rights. Very often actors to whom most other actors have to report also exercise formal decision rights in a political-administrative system; therefore, even in policy networks they often have the possibility of imposing sanctions-for example, cutting back finances. In technical terms, this means that the higher the indegree for an actor is (the higher the number of received ties) the more formal decision rights he will probably have.
It therefore represents a good operationalization for the coercive dimension of power based on formal rules in political decision systems. The use of this type of tie has the advantage that the relational data can be reconstructed from records that are available to the public. Therefore, in this study the data were reconstructed by the author on the basis of the formal rules within the basic law (German constitution), the central laws and regulations within the sectors, the transformation of East Germany, and written agreements between the actors.
21
The structures as portrayed in the visualized graphs show striking similarities. In both cases, they are clearly dominated by the political (light gray circles for parliamentary caucuses) and administrative actors (black nodes). 22 In the case of the shipbuilding industry, however, one of the party caucuses in the federal parliament (27), which did not play any role in the steel case, comes up on top. It does not come as a real surprise that societal and private actors do not score high on power, based on formal decision rights in the polity. In fact, the hierarchization of the structure based on formal obligation of report for both cases is 99 percent, and given the dominance of the political-administrative actors, hierarchy clearly worked in their favor. Therefore, the impact of power based on formal decision rights is evident if we look at the final power structure (exhibits 8 and 10) which is exclusively dominated by administrative actors. The latter could very much profit from and preserve their power, which comes from formal decision rights and competencies. This was not the case for the parliamentary actors (light gray nodes) on the federal and the state level, which is a wellknown and often discussed phenomenon in political science. In situations of rapid political developments or technically difficult matters the executive bodies regularly dominate, and parliaments have difficulty upholding their control rights and their influenceparticularly if problems are dealt with in policy networks (see for example Schneider 1999 and 2000) .
However, this is not the whole story. As we have seen, rather dense horizontal communication structures existed in both cases.
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Policy Networks a h\ a recent study on the transformation of the former socialist party in the GDR after 1990, Hedin (2001) calls this the "logic of interpersonal trust," a third logic of action besides "the logic ofconsequentiality and ... the logic of appropriateness" proposed by March and Olsen (1989) .
What other factors, we might ask, have led to such an intense involvement, if the final impact on the decisions that could be made by many of these actors was not as strong as they probably had hoped for? Here, two groups of informal institutions can generally be identified. First, some tradition on earlier occasions of participation among these actors in the sectors studied, and second, a general tradition of consensus building with respect to the management of the economy.
Some of the West German organizations in this study had communicated with each other before 1990. The West German steel industry and the shipbuilding industry had gone through an intensive process of overcapacity reduction and restructuring since the late 1970s. Thus the West German actors had already experienced similar issues and a similar response. Many links of the network were reactivated, especially those between actors that had built up trust in the past. 23 Regarding the steel industry, Esser and Fach (1989, 239) state that "it appears that corporatist decision making in the steel industry is based on long-standing practices and wellestablished institutions. In a serious crisis, the industry can call upon the knowledge and resources of all the participants in the corporatist coalition." A strong sense of crisis indeed existed among the actors, as is apparent in question 9 in exhibit 11. An overwhelming majority (84%) agreed that they saw the transformation of these two sectors as an industrial crisis in which something had to be done. It was simply unthinkable for German political actors to see a whole region and whole sectors go downhill without taking action. The actors drew closer together and engaged in intense communication. They still had, of course, their own interests in mind, but the orientation clearly shifted toward finding a solution that would serve the common good. The perception of a crisis, however, had another effect. Some schools of thought in organization theory and political science have long claimed that the usual response to crisis is to fall back on established routines and institutions (March and Olson 1989, 34ff) . For the transformation of East Germany, that meant that actors would rely on institutions and routines that had been successful in West Germany (see Lehmbruch 1996, 119) . This argument is supported only by empirical evidence for the steel industry. The question, Did the crises in the two sectors in the 1980s in West Germany serve as an important background? was negatively answered by the respondents in the shipbuilding industry and positively answered by respondents in the steel case (question 8 in exhibit 11). This is probably because many respondents were not happy with the development of the shipbuilding sector in West Germany at that time. In the steel industry, on the other hand, coping with crises had been much more intense and in a much more corporatist style than in the shipbuilding industry. 
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Many studies on industrial restructuring have demonstrated that in Germany a general tradition of consensus building with respect to the management of the economy is an important resource (Esser and Fach 1989; Katzenstein 1987; Kenis 1991) . As a consequence, a pragmatic rather than an ideological stance usually is taken in industrial crisis situations, which is an important precondition for the finding of a common solution. The main characteristic of the West German model that was transferred to East Germany is characterized by a consensus about the specific role of the relevant actors within the social market economy. In this system, the government is expected to accompany structural change, to function as a moderator, and to buffer the consequences with financial resources and political programs. The employers, on the other hand, have to take a share of responsibility for the social order and social peace in German society. Consequently, the option for the employees to bear the entire burden of the costs in a restructuring process is not available. The unions, on the other hand, are expected to take some responsibility for the development and competitiveness of the firms. In some sectors, as in steel and shipbuilding, where the law of codetermination does apply, representatives of the unions and workers' councils form half of the membership of the supervisory board of the joint stock company. This excludes demands and actions without paying attention to the consequences for the firms. A general consensus exists that it makes no sense to fight modernization (Esser and Fach 1989) and that all parties have to cooperate to ensure that the modernization process is as smooth as possible.
In the cases that are studied here, this consensus is expressed in the assessments of the statements about the use of public subsides for industrial restructuring (question 1 in exhibit 11). A majority agreed that public funds should be used to foster and bolster the transformation. The actors took a pragmatic, though mixed, stance on the inclusion of both economic and political criteria in the decision process (questions 2 and 3 in exhibit 11) which is a typical feature in coping with industrial crises in Germany. A majority approved the role of government actors as mediators (question 4), a strong majority approved the participation and influence of the union and the workers' councils in the decision process (question 5), and an equally strong majority favored cooperative decision making (question 6). On the other hand, only a small minority (19 percent and 10 percent; see question 3) was in favor of a hierarchical decision making by the Treuhandanstalt.
With the exception of question 8, which focuses on the importance of the prior processes in West Germany for the governance structures and the solutions in East Germany, the results were quite similar for both sectors. The ideas of the actors in both sectors
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Policy Networks regarding the appropriate governance form to deal with the problems clearly indicate a preference for a network-like governance form in which cooperation and consensus are important factors. Complementary, hierarchy, and market as general modes of governance for the transformation were seen rather critically. This is additional evidence that institutional factors on the macro and meso levels played an important role in shaping the governance structure and the decision processes.
Although the overall structures in both cases very much resembled each other, there are some minor but interesting differences. They can be explained by the characteristics of persons who functioned as representatives. There is, for example, the more prominent role of the state government (4) in the steel case when it is compared to the shipbuilding case (14,16) in the final power structure, hi the first case, the minister president was quite popular and worked amiably with the minister of economics from one of the coalition partners; in the latter case, though, a major conflict existed between the two persons who were from different parties, which clearly diminished the influence of the state government. Another example is the more central position of the union in the communication structure in the shipbuilding case as compared to the steel case. Here the union functionary was represented on the supervisory boards of almost all companies in the sector. He linked many of the actors in East and West personally, whereas his counterpart in the steel industry was very much confined to a narrow role. For example, he was not on the supervisory board of the East German company. It is evident that in the end it is organizations and the people who represent them who must have the will and resolve to act.
Power, Interest, and Political Will of the Actors Involved
The engagement of actors in political processes is very much dependent on the importance they assign to an issue (issue interest). The actors' assessments determine what resources are invested with respect to personnel, finances, time, and attention. This in turn influences the extent and intensity of communication. As a consequence, it is very likely that knowledge, competence, and the possibility of controlling information are improved, which creates potential influence, hi addition, the probability that actors will participate in decisions should increase with growing interest in issues. Both cases had a high priority with the federal government. It wanted to control the political risks of the economic crises in East Germany under any circumstances. The potential conflicts and political risks were especially great in these cases. The federal government did not leave it entirely up to the Treuhandanstalt to make the crucial 616/J-PART, October 2002 Policy Networks decisions. Consequently, it is not surprising that the government's plenipotentiary for East Germany was very active, and Chancellor Kohl became personally involved several times. The same was true for the state governments. They concentrated attention and resources in a way that was not possible in the routine cases of mass privatization and therefore considerably enhanced their importance as actors. Formal institutional structures were activated and strengthened, and the position of the Treuhand became less prominent. The contrary, however, was true for the West German actors. The consequences of the transformation in East Germany were not really grasped and the West German states with competitors' sites did not want to risk a conflict with the federal government in order to secure future subsidies for their sites. These results confirm findings by Laumann and Knoke (1987) for the United States in their study Organizational State. They found that issue interest had a considerable direct influence on "policy event participation'' (p. 280). The results also confirmed that state actors are not neutral players who only react to the different pressure from interest groups as the pluralist approach would claim. Rather, they try to achieve their own goals and seek support from interest groups or intervene in favor of interest groups that have compatible interests, as it happened massively in the case of the steel plant. In addition, the federal government had to control the political costs of the shock therapy under any circumstances in order not to endanger the overall strategy for the transformation of East Germany and ultimately to stay in power. Therefore, it was very much inclined to use the potential of interorganizational networks for political pacification. It is clear that in the case of the privatization of large sectors, a large number of persons and other private and public organizations were affected. In such cases, political conflicts could have developed easily, which could have hindered, if not halted, the entire privatization process. Giving the actors who were affected by privatization access to the decision making within such a network of interorganizational relations resulted in cooptation and, consequently, pacification of these organizations and their members. The union and the East German state governments that potentially could have disrupted the privatization process were coopted. They were included in the inner decision-making circle in exchange for the acceptance of tough cutbacks, especially in jobs. However, it was not only the granting of access but also the availability of financial resources that facilitated consensus building. In these privatization and restructuring processes, tens of thousands of people who were located in geographically dense areas were laid off within four years. Both sectors had to go through a process of economic restructuring in four years that had taken their West German counterparts twenty years. Financial resources were of great importance, both in organizing and in buffering the consequences Policy Networks of such a crash course. Several billions of DM were spent in the two cases. The financial resources were used not only to deal with material consequences of the restructuring but also to facilitate consensus among different actors. For example, an incentive was given to stay in the privatization network as long as there were major resources to be distributed. The consensus of the union, workers' councils, and state governments in the case of large-scale layoffs can be secured more easily if there is enough money to create alternative jobs, to finance retraining programs, or to pay compensation. The Treuhandanstalt alone, after four years of existence, had accumulated a deficit of approximately 260 billion DM, aside from the money that was transferred in the general social programs and wider political programs. This money was made available by a higher federal deficit, cutbacks of other positions in the budget, and the so-called solidarity tax surcharge. Although this extra tax still has to be paid by all Germans, the majority is raised in West Germany and transferred to the East The federal government clearly used these enormous financial resources to lubricate the governance structure and to keep vital players on board.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have attempted to answer important empirical research questions regarding the transformation of East Germany after 1990.1 have explained how it was possible to privatize two industrial megaconglomerates in East Germany under very difficult circumstances and have argued that a combination of dense, rather horizontal communication structures and medium hierarchical power structures was the dominant feature of the governance form that brought about the necessary legitimacy for the difficult changes by coopting vital actors. I have argued also that the hierarchical element in the governance structure, which was ultimately dominated by the privatization agency, prevented a goal displacement and kept the decision process on track. It could be fruitful for further research on policy-making structures to use this insight. Of special interest is whether or not the positive relationship between these structural features and successful policy outcomes would also hold true in other settings and circumstances and eventually lead to a modification of Selznick's (1949) thesis of cooptation and goal displacement.
I then tried to explain why these specific governance structures developed in two cases that very much resembled each other. Five groups of explanatory factors put their mark on the governance structures and the decision processes. First, during the privatization of large companies that became politicized, it became apparent that the initial hierarchical and bureaucratic governance structure was
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Policy Networks inadequate for solving their problems. Second, a network form of governance has certain comparative advantages such as intense (informal) communication with a high information load, mobilization of diverse knowledge, and trust relationships that seem to have been necessary in dealing with some of the crucial problems the actors faced. Third, contextual factors such as the presence of corporate actors with strategic capabilities or the existence of one or two focal actors were identified as basic preconditions for the development of policy networks. Fourth, the perception of the situation as a crisis caused actors to fall back on established formal and informal (e.g., corporatist) routines that had been applied and tested in West Germany in earlier decades. A vast majority of actors clearly favored a governance form based on cooperation and consensus rather than on conflict, competition, or hierarchical fiat. It is therefore confirmed that informal norms and values in a political system that could also be summarized as political culture denote a corridor in which the development of certain governance forms is more likely. Fifth, power, interest, and the political will of the actors played an important role for the activation of formal institutional rules and for the specific positions of the actors. Upon looking at this list of explanatory factors, it can be concluded that both the "logic of appropriateness" and the "logic of consequentiality" (March and Olsen 1989) were vital in the formation processes of the governance structures presented here.
The results also demonstrate that formal decision competencies, which are awarded by regulations in the constitution and the specific laws of the policy field, have a strong impact on forming the power positions of the political actors. This emphasis stands in contrast to the stress that is put on informal relations and on negotiations between state and societal actors as more or less equal parties in the current literature on policy networks. When it comes to issues that are perceived as important by the public and the most significant political-administrative actors, it is very likely that the formal institutional structures will be a dominant factor in the formation of governance structures.
One limitation of the study is the static character of quantitative network analysis. It maps social and political structures in a medium aggregate state. Standard network-analytic methods cannot capture changes over time unless the researcher divides the process under consideration into different time periods. That in turn requires considerable prior knowledge of the processes and is accompanied by considerable problems for the data collection, since the perception of human beings about their professional relations at different times in the past might not be very accurate.
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Another limitation is the difficulty of distinguishing between governance structures as phenomena to be explained and explanatory factors, even in an exploratory setting. Similar cognitive perceptions clearly facilitate interaction and cooperation, but they are in turn influenced by these interactions. Usually it takes some time and some discussion for actors to find a common definition of a problem. This study, therefore, confirms the need to reconcile structure and agency on a theoretical level and also to improve the way structural analysis is used to analyze and explain dynamic policy processes on a methodological level.
